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Abstract
1
 
This paper reviews the pension systems of  Portugal  and explores comparative analysis  with other Southern 
European (SE) countries and tries to show responses to the new political and economic realities in recent years. 
According to a review of pension systems in SE countries, this paper summarizes and highlights the main 
features and trajectories of the development of social security systems in four countries (Portugal, Italy, Greece, 
and Spain) that are dealing with the challenges of these systems. It also examines the deeper challenges for the 
future that are posed by demographics and suggests some emerging proposals with respect to the architecture of 
reformed systems.  Comparative analysis of this region the challenges still remain unchangeable last decades. 
According to crucial issues raised in the pension system of SE,   to the respond of these challenges the author   is 
forming several approaches with recommendations and proposals for solving the problem in pension system.This 
paper reviews the pension systems of the region and explores comparative analysis based on historical brief 
background and tries to show responses to the new political and economic realities in recent years. It summarizes 
and highlights the main features and trajectories of the development of social security systems in four countries 
(Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain) that are dealing with the challenges of these systems. It also examines the 
deeper challenges for the future that are posed by demographics and suggests some emerging proposals with 
respect to the architecture of reformed systems. In the future  as for the next  research  we are planning to work 
on the individual pension models based on PROST program (The World bank )  as  options simulation toolkit for 
each countries  separately in Southern Europe. This study will reflect a developing process of the fully funding 
pension scheme and its implication on social-economic factors. The structure of the paper is the following- 
Section 2 discusses the common socio-economic indicators of the SE countries, focused in particular on the 
aging process. Section 3 details the pension systems of these four SE countries: Greece, Italy, Portugal, and 
Spain. This section also highlights the major reforms carried out by their governments over the last decade. 
Finally, Section 4 consists of conclusion. 
Keywords:  aging, pension, retirement age,  pension spending. 
 
Introduction 
Demographic change is considered to be a worldwide phenomenon today, resulting from such universal 
tendencies: declining fertility, mortality, rising longevity,  migration2. Most countries in the world experience 
declining fertility or still have stagnating fertility. Increasing life expectancy and declining fertility rate caused 
financial difficulties in Southern European countries, and especially pension systems in the world today face a 
series of challenges.  
The European Union (EU) has been extended to include almost 500 million people (about 124 million3 
or a quarter of the total), and European populations are today facing a common future in a number of important 
respects. Amongst other things, these include an ageing of populations, a changing working life and a new 
gender balance4.  Dramatic  increase in the number of retired people  (so called “Baby Boomers”)  had been  
provoked  by creation of classification of this  group as the "young old"  (between 65-74),  the "old"  (between 
                                                 
1 The authors acknowledge the comments from the participants at the Conferences “The Welfare State in Portugal in the Age 
of Austerity” where a previous version of this work has been discussed. The authors also thank the comments from 
anonymous referees of International Affairs and Global Strategy: Remaining errors are authors’ exclusive ones. 
2 B. Malmberg, K. Tamas, D. Bloom, R. Munz, D. Canning, 2006 Global Population Ageing, Migration and European 
External Policies, © Institutet för Framtidsstudier 
3 Eurostat,  2013. ADEQUACY AND SUSTAINABILITY OF PENSIONS 
4 World Population Ageing 2013, Department of Economic and Social Affairs  Population Division,  United nations,  
New York, 2013 , 
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/ageing/WorldPopulationAgeing2013.pdf  
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74-84) and the "oldest-old"  ( above 85+ ) groups1. Therefore pension spending will become higher in rapidly 
rising longevity in an age, unless lasting reform is undertaken. Demographically “aging world" creates threats  
and confrontation in both PAYG and funded systems.  
According to the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe2, more than 90 percent of older 
peoples live independently in the North Europe, when  the same parameter for Southern Europe is hardly 60 
percent. This trend  clarifies  the real depth of the problems with social care and support for older people in the 
world and especially in Europe today.  
The increase of the dependency rate, the reduction of fertility rates and the decrease of birth rates are important 
aspects  to determine current and future adversity of Southern European (Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal) 
Pension System. Today, there are almost 4 people of working age for every person over  65. By the estimation of 
experts it was expected that there will be only 2 people of working age for every person over 65  in 1950.3 
People born in that time are expected to live between 6 and 8 years longer than people born today and people 
retiring are expected to live between 5 and 7 years longer than people retiring today4.  
Population aging is becoming one of the “mega trends” for  the new century. Therefore, three main points are 
emphasized: 1) the challenge of population aging (declining fertility and increasing longevity) and its 
implications for the maintenance of adequate and sustainable pensions, 2) financial sustainability as “a necessary 
precondition for an adequate provision of pensions in the future,” and 3) “the modernization of pensions 
systems,” which relates to the labor market: part-time, temporary, self-employed and mobile workers (statutory 
schemes respond well to the challenge of providing pensions for atypical workers). 
For more than a decade now, this pension issues as big challenges  for almost all countries in the world 
has been discussed in the context of the modernisation by the way of reforms of social security system. 
Historically the “European social model” as welfare state(s) were founded in Europe based on the recognition of 
social rights. These welfare states are considered today as fundamental within the European and international 
legal order (European Social Charter, 1961)5. Nevertheless, social policies have some differences among the 
various European national systems of social security (Esping-Andersen G, 1990). In the majority of European 
countries, the reform efforts that have been conducted are considered insufficient, even though European 
countries have undertaken major reforms to make their pension systems financially sustainable. The similarities 
and the differences among Southern European countries draw special criticism to some previous trials of 
taxonomy, like the one purposed by Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999). 
One major criticism of Esping-Andersen’s classification is that he did not systematically include the 
Mediterranean countries.  Which has become a cause for lively debate about the existence of a  “Southern” or 
“Latin Rim” model of social policy. According to Busch et al. (2013), classification of welfare in SE is 
considered to be as either the “Latin Rim” of European social policy (Leibfried, 1992; Ferrera, 1996) or the 
“Southern model” of social policy (Ferrera, 1996) characterised by a clientistic and rudimentary design. The 
Southern European welfare states was considered as a “clientistic” because some employees in certain industries 
and occupations are still privileged and they are considered “rudimentary” because, among other important 
things, family policies and labour market policy was not  well developed (Busch et al, 2013). In all four 
countries in the region, “Bismarckian” type of  public pensions of plays a central role. Among the multi-pillar 
schemes (second pillar) and individual voluntary provision (third pillar) are not very widespread and refined in 
SE (except of the case of Italy’s pension system, with an additional NDC scheme since 1995). 
The Southern European countries has been considered as a model of the conservative welfare regime 
(Esping-Andersen, 1999; Katrougalos & Lazaridis, 2003). The welfare systems of Italy, Greece, Portugal and 
Spain share all the basic institutional characteristics of the “state corporatist” welfare model. All of their 
Constitutions establish the normative principle of the “Social State” either explicitly 6  or by means of 
constitutional provisions guaranteeing a number of social rights7.   
                                                 
1 Lisa Kimball, Ph.D.2011, SPIRITUAL VITALITY OVER 70, Center for the Ministry of Teaching, Virginia Theological 
Seminary 
2 Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) study (Munich Center for the Economics of Aging, 2011). 
3 Corin Taylor, Senior Policy Adviser, The Pensions Apartheid: The problem, the cost and the tough choices that need to 
be made 
4 Corin Taylor, Senior Policy Adviser, The Pensions Apartheid: The problem, the cost and the tough choices that need to 
be made written by Corin Taylor, Senior Policy Adviser 
5 See the Social Charter of the Council of Europe (1961), the Community Charter of the fundamental social rights of 
workers (1989), the European charter of fundamental rights (2000); see also the ILO regulations. 
6 Constitution of Spain and  the Constitution of Portugal. 
7 The articles 2-4,31,31,35-38,41,45,46 of the Italian Constitution. 21.22.of the Greek one, 39-52.129.148. 149 of the 
Spanish and  56.59.63-72.108.167.216 of the Constitution of Portuguese. 
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          There is sufficient evidence of similarities and shared experiences at the socio-economic and political 
levels for undertaking fruitful comparative analyses across the four countries.  But alongside these similarities, 
these four countries exhibit significant differences as well. Italy has had a longer democratic experience than the 
rest of the Southern nations. According to the Joint Report by the Commission and the Council on adequate and 
sustainable pensions that was approved on March 6, 2003 by the Council1, it was stated that all the European 
countries had developed pension systems, so that old age was no longer synonymous with poverty, situation is 
now threatened by the aging process.  
All the countries in this region inherited state monopoly pay-as-you-go (PAYG) schemes using 
conventional defined benefit (DB) (traditional) formulas. The main discussion on the old pay-as-you-go (PAYG) 
systems still remains a core agenda of hot debate globally among politicians, researchers and academics 
Therefore, the financial unsustainability of PAYG systems, combined with the prospective aging population 
across the world, has led many countries to re-think their pension systems. 
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 discusses the common socio-economic indicators of 
the SE countries, focused in particular on the aging process. Section 3 details the pension systems of these four 
SE countries: Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. This section also highlights the major reforms carried out by 
their governments over the last decade. Finally, Section 4 consists of conclusion.  
 
Pension Systems and Statistical Figures of the Southern European Countries 
Pension benefits – mostly from public schemes – are the main source of income of older Europeans, who are a 
representative and growing part of the EU population (120 million or 24%).2 It represent a significant and rising 
share of public expenditure: more than 10% of GDP on average today, possibly rising to 12 ½  % in 2060 in the 
EU as a whole. But with spending on public pensions ranging in Europe (from 6% of GDP in Ireland to 15% in 
Italy) today, countries are in rather different situations although they face similar demographic challenges. The 
sustainability and adequacy of pension systems depends on the degree to which they are underpinned by 
contributions, taxes and savings from people in employment. 
  
Although both types of  pension schemes have their own advantages and disadvantages, which has been 
described by Eatwell, the table 1.  shows that there is no any ideal pension model in world (Eatwell, 2003).  
Table 1 – Advantages and Disadvantages of Pension Systems 
Pension Systems Advantages Disadvantages 
Pay-as-you-go 
(PAYG) pensions 
 
* Simplicity and transparency  
* Low administration costs 
* Progressive redistribution 
* Wide coverage 
* Do not inhibit the mobility of labor 
* Low risk 
* Budgetary burden 
* No “choice” 
* Over-commitment to a specific level of 
pensions 
* Resistance to tax funding 
 
Fully-funded (FF) 
pensions 
*Higher returns from professional equity 
investment 
*  * Saver has independence and choice 
* Increases savings and growth 
* Promotes the development of financial 
markets 
*Effective Corporate governance 
* Automatically adjusts the level of 
pension to available returns 
*Regressive impact on the distribution of 
income 
* High administrative costs 
* Limited coverage 
* Uncertain return (high risk) 
* Need for a social security safety net 
* In some cases limits mobility of labor 
(occupational pensions) 
Source: Eatwell J. 2003, The Anatomy of the Pension “Crisis” 
  
Before detailing the discussion for each SE country, it may be convenient to discuss some indicators for 
Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain (GIPS) with specific figures. Pension models for this region have been heavily 
discussed in recent years. These countries are all in recession and have current account deficit according to data 
taken from the latest statistical sources and reports3. Poverty rate and income inequality are also increasing and 
the unemployment rate is significantly high.  
 
                                                 
1 Joint report by the Commission and the Council on adequate and sustainable pensions, Council of the European Union, 
Brussels, 10 March 2003, ECOFIN 76, SOC 115, 7165/03. 
2  An Agenda for Adequate, Safe and Sustainable Pensions 2012, White  paper, 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=89&newsId=1194&furtherNews=yes  
3 Eurostat, OECD, IMF,  and World Economic Outlook. 2014 
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Figure.1  Population (65+) living at risk of poverty or social exclusion, 2012 
 
Source: Eurostat.2013 
 
According to figure.1  the living at risk of poverty  in population since  65 ages in all the southern 
European region  is above average. Most critical position is characterized for  Greece, followed by Portugal, 
Italy and Spain.  Gini index  is  getting raised in Spain  since 2010 and it indicates increasing rates for Portugal 
as well. (Figure 2.)  
 
Figure 2. Gini Coefficient of equalised disposable income 
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        According to OECD data of expenditure on social protection (as a % of GDP), we can confirm that the 
amount of expenditures have increased in recent years. The reality is that among the southern European countries 
the crisis in pension system is very harsh in Greece. Overall, crucial challenges remain in respect to all three 
dimensions (distributional justice, benefit adequacy and fiscal rationalization), as well as in respect to thoroughly 
encouraging active ageing.  But pension indicators even in this region are not similar in terms of retirement ages 
and the average monthly   pension amounts. 
 
Figure  3. Public  and private expenditure on pensions in selected OECD countries, 2012, As a percentage 
of GDP 
 
Source: OECD Global Pension Statistics. 
The figure 3.  reflects that public pension expenditure remains  most high index in Italy, the private 
pension expenditure doesn’t play powerful role in Southern European countries. Pubic pension expenditure on 
social protection is most high  in Greece, followed by Italy. Public pension spending in Italy represents 15.4% 
of GDP, and Portugal with 12.3% and Greece with  13%, and in SE Spain is the country with the 
least spending of public pension at 9.3% (while the average of this indicator in OECD is  7.8%). 
Southern European countries are different from each other  with specific indicators (Gross replacement 
rate, public pension spending, life expectancy , etc.) of pension systems.  Therefore, these parameters define the 
scope of the problem in these countries. 
Table 2.  – Key indicators for SE Pension systems 2013  
Indicators Greece Italy Portugal Spain OECD 
Gross replacement rate 
Average earner (%) 53.9 71.2 54.7 73.9 54.4 
Low earner (%) 75.4 71.2 67.5 73.9 71 
Public pension spending % of GDP 13 15.4 12.3 9.3 7.8 
Life expectancy 
at birth 80.7 82.2 79.8 82 79.9 
at age 65 19.2 20.3 18.9 20.4 19.1 
Population over age 65 and 
over 
% of working-age 
population 31.7 34.5 30.1 27.9 25.5 
Average worker earnings 
(AW) 
  EUR 
20 100 28 900 15 700 25 600 32 400 
Source: OECD (2013), Pensions at a Glance 2013: OECD and G20 indicators. 
 
  Table 2 reflects   SE countries’  experience in series of demographic and social changes: increased life 
expectancy, aging population, shorter active phases and longer retirement periods. All of these factors, along 
with growing concern about the sustainability of public pension systems, have resulted in the increased 
importance of complementary pension systems, especially in light of favourable tax treatments.  
For each country in SE, despite many similarities, differ from one another in a variety of settings such 
as pensionable age (for  man and woman) and its  further increases in the pensionable age, conditions of  access 
to early retirement, which are indicated in the Table 3.  
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Table 3.   Pensionable ages and complementary pensions in SE 
 
Southern 
Europe 
Pensionable 
age for M/W 
Pensionable 
age for M/W in 
2020 
Further 
increases in the 
pensionable 
age for M/W 
after 2020 
Conditions of 
Access to Early Retirement 
    Spain 65/65 
66 y 4m / 66 y 
4m 
67+/67+ 
60 years old (general scheme); Penalty: 
4% per year of anticipation 
   Italy 
65 y 4m   /  60 y 
4m 
66 y 11m  /   66 
y 11m 
67+/67+ 
58 years old (35 years of 
contributions);  Without any restriction 
in terms of age (40 years of 
contributions) 
   Portugal 65/65 65/65 65/66 
55 years old; Contributory period: 30 
years; Penalty: 0,5% per month of 
anticipation. 
Source: Eurostat, Financial Solvency of the Pension Systems in the European Union, 2013 
 
Pensions are a substantial part of the electorate in these countries. Most of the political decisions made in 
order to attract voters who are at the root of the serious obstacles of this system.   Therefore pension issues is 
considered to be as much more the political than socio-economic issues. 
 
1. A characterization of the pension systems of GIPS 
The pension system in Portugal 
Portugal, like other European countries, has been deeply affected by ageing population. In particular, in the last 
30 years, a deteriorating the main demographic indicators such as the birth rate and gains in life expectancy are 
deteriorating.  The change in the demographic pyramids yields an increasing old-age dependency ratio, which 
has almost  doubled in 2013 compared to 1960 year (12.7% in 1961, to 29.9% in 2013)1 while longevity index 
(ratio of the number of oldest old persons (aged 75 and over) to the number of elderly persons of an age when 
they are generally economically inactive (aged 65 and over),  grew  from around 33.3%  to 48.9 %  in the same 
period. The Social Security expenditure as a % of GDP  from 7.6% in 1990 has been increased to 22% in 2012.2 
Portuguese Pension System and its previous evolution takes special relevance. The main two 
remarkable demographic risks are threaten to this system  -  a decrease of the labor force and an increase of 
retired people, which is  doubling of the dependency rate3. This situation deteriorates the financial base of PAYG 
Systems and becomes burden for state budget of the country.   
 
A brief history of Social security in Portugal 
Primarily, the legal concept of social security as “seguranca social”  was appeared in 19734 and  the required 
period of  participation in the old-age insurance system had been reduced from 10 to 3 years, the minimum 
contribution period from 60 to 24 months, and  relatively, the retirement age of women from 65 to 62 years 
(Chuliá E, Asensio M 2007).  Initially, social security contribution was 23.5% of the salary, which was increased, 
to 28.5%, including 20.5% payable by the employer and 8.0% by the employee. After the 1974 revolution new 
government  the thirteenth old-age pension5 payable at Christmas were introduced.( Stańko D. 2004)  From 1985  
under new regulation additional retirement schemes  was established  financed by the employers and supervised 
by the Portuguese Institute of Insurances (Instituto de Seguros de Portugal, ISP) (Pavao Nunes J. 2007).). Later, 
the standard contributory rate for the general scheme of social security was fixed at 35 per cent6.   
The majority of the population in Portugal is involved essentially in two different systems: Solidarity 
System of Social Security (covered all employees of the private sector and independent workers) and the System 
of Government Employees Social Protection ( for only civil servants), adopted by Caixa Geral de Aposentações.. 
                                                 
1 Ageing indicators in Portugal, 2014 , http://www.pordata.pt/en/Portugal/Ageing+indicators-526  
2 PORDATA 2014. 
3Tânia Cristina Simões de Matos dos Santos,  2012, Immigration and pension system in Portugal, Center of Research in 
International Business & Strategy, WORKING PAPER Nº 84/2012  
4 Chuliá E – Asensio M (2007), Portugal: in search of a stable framework, in: K. M. Anderson, E. M. Immergut and I. 
Schulze (Eds.), The Handbook of West European Pension Politics, Oxford, University Press, pp. 499-554. 
5 Like in Greece 
6 Vanda Cunha, Ariana Paulo, Nuno Sousa Pereira and Hélder Reis, 2014,  THE REFORM OF THE PORTUGUESE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES’ PENSION SYSTEM: REASONS AND RESULTS  
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The systems  differs by  mechanisms and histories, in terms of old-age, early retirement condition, disability, 
survivors (widows and orphans) pensions and other specific situations including those due to reduced capacity to 
work and those due to labour market reasons1.  
 The one the initial major revision of the social security system was done in 1993, by increasing the 
legal retirement age for women to 65 years and the minimum contributory period has been raised from ten to 
fifteen years. Keeping the stability of the pension system of Portugal  with three  pillars2  is based on the 
Bismarck’s formula completed with the Beveridges welfare solution.  The public pension system functions in the 
pay-as-you-go formula and is a compulsory system with a defined benefit financed by the contributions 
contributed by employers, employees and by the budgetary subsidy. Pension funds, both professional and 
individual, are of less importance in Portugal. Without financial assistance in the form of a budgetary subsidy, 
the pension system in that country ceases to be viable and generates a deficit every year. According to projection 
of  European Union Portugal might  spend 20% of its GDP in 2050 solely on pensions (Schneider, 2009).  
There are two main regimes in the system: A) the basic regime (Regime Geral, RG), and B) the regime 
for state officials (Regime de proteccao social da funcao publica) managed by the CGA and most often identified 
by that very abbreviation. The basic regime contains three schemes: a non-contribution one: a) the Non-
Contribution and Equalizing Regime, (regarded as a kind of ‘zero pillar’ as it is financed by public taxes,  first of 
all by the VAT (social VAT - in comparison with other SE countries, the use of a certain amount of income from 
VAT to finance the pension system is an exclusive solution), without contributions.) b) the Basic Contribution 
Regime (the retirement age is 65 for both sexes3.), c) the Transitory Rural Regime for farmers. All the schemes 
are managed by the Institute for Financial Management of Social Security (Instituto de Gestao Financeira da 
Seguranca Social, IGFSS)4. 
Without financial assistance in the form of a budgetary subsidy, the pension system in that country stops 
to be viable and generates a deficit every year. The persistent economic downturn and higher public debt 
increases urgently need  for adjustments and modernization in the pension schemes in order to ensure their long 
term sustainability. Portugal has  higher shares of pension expenditures than the average level.  Old-age pensions 
and early pensions are the most important items among the pension expenditures disability pensions and survivor  
pensions only play a minor role.  
 The old-age pensions for civil servants in current  pension system are calculated from 1 January 2004, 
with reference to 90% of the salary. Towards the end of that year, the value of funds accumulated in the FEFSS5 - 
- was approximately €5.8 billion (Chulia E. Asensio M. (2007) From 1 July 2005, the VAT was increased from 
19% to 21% and the funds obtained in such a way earmarked in equal parts for social security and for the 
pension fund 2006 saw the introduction of a solidarity old-age allowance. According  2012 data,  the FEFSS had  
accumulated 10.7 billions of Euros. 
 
Table 4.  Indicators concerning social expenditure and beneficiaries   
Indicators  % in GDP   /   years   2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Education: expenditure   5,0 4,6 4,1 4,3 3,9 
Health: transfer for NHS 5,0 4,8 4,7 4,8 4,5 
Social security: transfer for the funding of the non-
contributive regime  4,3 3,9 3,8 3,8 3,7 
Sources: Several official sources 2014  (Social Security, INE, Government)  
 
The table 4 reflects a strong decline in social expenditure (health expenditure, unemployment benefit 
and education). Unemployment benefit coverage rates have fallen and so has the number of persons receiving 
family allowances and minimum incomes.  Inequality, which was already high in Portugal, has increased further, 
with the 10% highest income earners now gaining 10 times more than the 10% lowest earners. 
                                                 
1 B. Malmberg, K. Tamas, D. Bloom, R. Munz, D. Canning, 2006 Global Population Ageing, Migration and European 
External Policies, © Institutet för Framtidsstudier 
2 1) The public pension system as the 1st pillar, 2) company pension schemes as the 2nd pillar and 3) individual saving and 
pension schemes as the 3rd pillar, with other there are other pension solutions for the financial and telecommunications 
sectors and for lawyers  
3 In the case of certain professional groups, the standard retirement age is younger than the above, this being 60 (for flying 
staff in the aviation sector), 55 (for port employees, merchant navy seamen, fishermen, air traffic controllers and for ballet 
artists)3 or even 50 (for miners) Ballet artists may retire as early as at the age of 45 but with relevant reduction of the pension 
benefit. For other professional groups, early retirement is possible at the age of 55 on condition of 30 years of participation in 
the system  - Social Security Programs Throughout the World: Europe, 2006 (2006), p. 2 53  
4 http://www.portaldocidadao.pt/PORTAL/entidades/MTSS/IGFSS/pt/ORG_instituto+de+gestao+financeira+da+seguranca+s
ocial.htm, accessed 7 January 2008.  
5 Fund for Financial Stabilisation of Social Security (Fundo de Estabilizacao Financeira da Seguranca Social, FEFSS) 
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There were  some ways of  old-age pension calculation,  one of the formulas was used  for  the people 
with the participation period in the system being less than 20 years: 
 
where: 
P – a monthly old-age pension, 
2% – an annual accumulation rate, 
N – years of the participation in the scheme, 
R – the base salary. 
Another formula was for the people with  more than 20 years participating in the scheme the accumulation rate 
was  between 2.0 and 2.3% and depended on the relationship between the individuals salary and the minimum 
national one. (Whitehouse E. 2007) 
The base salary was  calculated with reference to the following formula:  
     
where, 
E –  the average monthly salary.  N could not be more than 40 and, if the number of years of participation in the 
scheme was actually greater than the above number, 40 years with the highest earnings was taken into 
consideration.  
14 –time,    old-age pensions are paid 14 times a year thus including two bonus payments, which  was made in 
July and before Christmas. (Whitehouse E. 2007) 
There were another different schemes for farmers (The Transitory Rural Regime (RESSAA/RRT) And regime 
for state officials (CGA), Company pension plans, Individual saving and pension plans.   The old-age pension 
for farmers was calculated with reference to the following formula: 
 
where: 
P – the monthly old-age pension, 
R – the last or average salary, 
T – the number of years of actual participation in the scheme. 
The scheme is still managed by the General Pension Fund (Caixa Geral de Aposentacoes, CGA) ruled 
by  the Ministry of Finance (Ministerio das Financas e da Administracao Publica)1. 
The  total number of beneficiaries in ADSE - Public Administration Social Security Fund  during the 56 
years   has cardinally increased   from 57 174  in 1966  to 1 333 477 in 2012.  Retirees of the Public 
Administration Retirement Fund  increased from 203 141  individuals  in 1993 to 471.149  individuals in 20132.  
According to evolution of the total number of old-age pensioners of public pension fund, retirees in 
Portugal constantly doubled  from 203 141 amount  in 1993 to  471 149 persons  in 2013.  Which has been 
effected on the public pension spending amount.3  Public pension expenditure in Portugal  is dramatically 
increasing when revenue of the retirement  fund decreasing.  In other  words it  demonstrates, the value of 
pensions has been  increasing, due to the increase of the number of pensioners and because of the composition 
effect (this effect is associated to new pensioners entries, whose pension value, on average, is higher than the 
pensions value received by individuals who leave the system).  Social Security revenue in 1971 from 58,613.7 
Euros (Thousands) increased to 2012 to 37,321,397.5 Euros (Thousands). Among the revenue, the share of 
contributions raised from 452,503.1 in 1980 to 13,082,142.3 in 2012 and  VAT additional consignment from 
433,954.2 Euros  (Thousands) (in 2000) to 891,895.0 Euros (Thousands) 2012. 
          In addition, the real economic activity slowdown in recent years, the economic, social and demographic 
effects of ageing and the maturation of Pension System have been contributing for the deterioration of the 
Portuguese Social Security financial sustainability. The rank of Portugal is on 9th the position with 24.5 
percentage of population aged 60 years or over in  2013. (on 1st  Rank is Japan, 2nd - Italy).  
 
1.1. Austerity Policy impact on Pension system in Portugal 
Against the background of the structural challenges facing the Portuguese economy and contagion from the 
sovereign debt crisis in other euro area countries, financial conditions facing  the Portuguese banks have acutely 
worsened. To restore market confidence and to raise the potential of our economy to generate socially balanced 
growth and employment we are proposing a far-reaching reform programme, backed by substantial international 
                                                 
1 http://www.cga.pt/cgaInicio.asp, accessed 4 January 2 008. 
2 Sources/Entities: CGA/MF, PORDATA 2014 
3 Sources/Entities: CGA/MF, PORDATA 2014  
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financing to meet balance of payments needs.1 Austerity measures fall into four types, each with its own unique 
consequences for the enjoyment of human rights: a) public budget contractions affecting social spending, b) 
regressive taxation measures, c) labour market reforms, and d) structural reforms to pension plans2. 
Many governments have chosen to reform pension systems, potentially deepening the increasing vul-
nerability and risk of poverty among older persons. Pensioners require special protection in accordance with 
Article 23 of the revised European Social Charter (ETS No. 163), which provides that Parties must, among other 
things, undertake to make available to elderly persons “adequate resources enabling them to lead a decent life 
and play an active part in public, social and cultural life”.  Many of these austerity measures (as a worldwide 
phenomenon) – characterised by public expenditure cuts, regressive tax hikes, reduced labour protection and 
pension reforms – have exacerbated the already severe human consequences of the economic crisis marked by 
record levels of unemployment. 
The Austerity policy  in Portugal caused massive demonstration the slogan “no to exploitation, inequality 
and impoverishment” against it.3 Protest was organised by The CGTP trade union attacking to the so-called 
“Social Partnership Agreement”4.  Austerity policy through the package of measures increased taxes, cuts in 
salary and pension amount, payment for healthcare, increased fares in public transport, higher tuition fees, 
increased hours of work, disregards on collective bargaining rights has caused the vast aggression on the living 
standards of the local people, especially for workers and pensioners.5 
According to lost affordable market access and facing fairly large  bond repayments, the Portuguese 
government decided to make a formal request for the  assistance program to the “TROIKA” (IMF and the 
European authorities) in April 2016.   The program covers four areas: (1) fiscal policy; (2) structural fiscal reform; 
(3) financial and corporate sectors reforms; and (4) competitiveness reforms. Which is based on €78 billion of 
international financial assistance over three years, corresponding to about 50 per cent of Portugal’s GDP in 2011. 
This financial program was impartially well designed but made a number of over-optimistic assumptions: 
• Due to fiscal adjustment and private deleveraging, real GDP was anticipated to decrease in 2011 and 
2012 and, but afterwards to subsequently rebound. 
• Unemployment was anticipated to rise in 2011 and 2012 but then to decline. 
• Inflation was anticipated to be high in 2011 and 2012 because of tax increases but low afterwards. 
• The fiscal deficit was anticipated to reach 3 percent of GDP by 2013 in line with the Excessive deficit 
Procedure objective. Public debt was expected to peak at 115.3 percent of GDP in 2013 and then to 
decline. 
The first Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Troika and the Portuguese government, 
signed in May 2011 by all governing parties (PS - Socialist Party -Partido Socialista,  PSD - Social Democratic 
Party “Partido Social Democrata” and CDS- People's Party – “Partido Popular”). The MoU contains specific 
conditionality on the expenditure side of fiscal policy, by reducing pensions above 1500 € according to the 
progressive rates applied to the wages of the public sector, suspend application of pension indexation rules and 
freeze pensions, except for the lowest pensions in 20127.  According to austerity policy on a massive  scale has 
suffered Greece (more than 25% of GDP), followed by Portugal with 16% of GDP, Spain  - 12% of GDP and 
7% of GDP for Italy.  (Figure 4 ) 
    
                                                 
1 International Monetary Fund, 2011. Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (Portuguese version), and Technical 
Memorandum of Understanding 
2 I. Ortiz and M. Cummins, “Age of Austerity: A Review of Public Expenditures and Adjustment Measures in 181 Countries”, 
Initiative for Policy Dialogue and the South Centre Working Paper, May 2013; Report of the UN Independent Expert on 
extreme poverty and human rights, Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona, 17 March 2011, A/HRC/17/34. 
3 Jorge Martin, Portugal: Massive demonstration against cuts and austerity http://www.marxist.com/portugal-massive-
demononstration-against-cuts.htm  
4 Reduction of holiday entitlement from 25 to 22 days a year and   the number of public holidays from 13 to 9 (significantly 
Independence day and Republic day are axed!). Reduction in lay off compensation from 30 days per year worked to 20 days. 
Flexibilization of working hours – 150 hours a year will be decided by the employer, lengthening the working day in busy 
periods, shortening it in others. Unemployed workers who accept work that pays less than their unemployment benefit are to 
keep 50 per cent of that benefit (thus saving the employer a lot of money). 50% reduction in overtime payment and in the 
payment of the 2 annual bonus payments. Increasing the cases in which workers can be sacked legally. Reduction in  
unemployment benefit, both in relation to the amount of money received and the length of time for which it will be received. 
Weakening of national collective bargaining in favour of company agreements (where workers are in a weaker position). 
5  International Marxist Tendency. Portugal: Massive demonstration against cuts and austerity 
http://www.marxist.com/portugal-massive-demononstration-against-cuts.htm 
6 Directorate General for Internal Policies Economic Governance Support Unit (EGOV) 
2014. The Troika and financial assistance in the euro area: successes and failures, Economic and Monetary Affairs 
Committee of European Parliament. 
7 Portugal: Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy  Conditionality, 2011,3 May 
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Figure. 4   Total of fiscal cuts from 2010 to 2014, in % of GDP (Austerity on a massive  scale) 
 
Source: IMK Report. Die Krise schwelt weiter. March2013.  
 
The expenditure per beneficiary of ADSE from 1990 until financial crisis  has been increasing, which  
raised almost 7 times , from 104.8  Euro –to 743.5 Euro. (In 2012  Social Security revenue per capita  was 
3,549.4 Euro, when in 1990 year  it was only 424.9 Euro).  After financial crisis and  due to the austerity policy  
this  amount  was halved gradually and in 2012  was 343.40 1 . Social Security pensions, from  total 
expenditure 12,329,339.4 (Euro - Thousands)  old-age (all schemes  consists of 9,454,711.1  Euro,  and rest of 
them belongs to disability and survival – (both of all schemes) pensions.   As for contributions, Contributions in 
total of Social Security revenue (%) it was decreased.  In 1960  year social security expenditure in Portugal  was 
1.2% in GDP, when in  2012 this indicator had been increased almost 20 times2.  
 
3.1 The pension system in Greece 
The public scheme of Greece has two components – a sort of minimum pension, and social safety nets. The 
retirement age is 65 for men and 60 for women. An early pension is payable from age 60. The Greek pensions 
system faces two fundamental problems. First, it is dominated by the state system pillar, funded directly – and in 
present circumstances unsustainably – by the stricken public purse. Public sector pensioners are paid directly by 
the government.    
Greece has the second-fastest aging process in the EU after Italy, with the old-age dependency ratio 
expected to increase from 27.6% in 2007 to 57.0% in 2050 compared to 50.4% in EU/27 (EPC, 2009), in a 
system entirely pay-as-you-go, which was predicted to have widespread cash shortfalls well before aging started.  
Financial sustainability has been the main concern behind the pension reforms enacted in Greece in the last years. 
Retirement-income adequacy may be an important concern for future retirees, but working longer may help to 
make income more adequate. It is also suggested that pension expenditures would have increased from about 
13% of GDP to about 24% by 2050. Rapid population aging in conjunction with the effects of the economic 
crisis and the rules and conditions of the pension system have put pension financing under severe stress. 
The institutional fragmentation of the public pension system (the existence of ‘old’ and ‘new’ pensions) and 
the lack of uniform solutions in that area constitute another important obstacle. Its consequences are sharp 
differences between the benefits while paying the same contributions. A wide range of pension privileges is 
another problem the Greek will have to face in future. The high unemployment rate, especially among women, 
leads to the lack of liquidity of the Greek pension system.3 
Among other southern European countries Greece presents an  extreme example of the extent of political 
factors’ influence in Europe. Pension issues are more  macro problem for Greek society. Part of the current 
                                                 
1 Sources/Entities: ADSE/MF, PORDATA).2014 
2 Source: Data Sources: IGFSS/MSSS, PORDATA 
3 The Greek National Strategy Report on Pension (2005), p. 8. 
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pension problem is due to the fact that current workers were the “missing generation” when the parameters of the 
current system were decided three decades ago. (Tinios, 2003)  
In terms of financial sustainability, the reforms in Greece aim to reduce pension spending significantly, by 
around 10% of GDP. The intention is for this to be achieved by strengthening the link between contributions and 
benefits, which will have an impact on the replacement rates of the system. Where the current rates are around 
100%, we may expect a significant decline once actuarial estimates are calculated using the parameters 
introduced in the recent reform. 
 The real GDP growth rate   of  Greece among  relatively notable and it is declining by  -3,9 %, when the 
same index for the European Union is     0,1 % (Table 5). 
 
Table 5.  Real GDP growth rate  Percentage change on previous year 
GEO/TIME 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
European Union (28 countries) 3,4 3,2 0,4 -4,5 2,0 1,6 -0,4 0,1 
Greece 5,5 3,5 -0,2 -3,1 -4,9 -7,1 -7,0 -3,9 
Spain 4,1 3,5 0,9 -3,8 -0,2 0,1 -1,6 -1,2 
Italy 2,2 1,7 -1,2 -5,5 1,7 0,4 -2,4 -1,9 
Portugal 1,4 2,4 0,0 -2,9 1,9 -1,3 -3,2 -1,4 
Source: Eurostat,2014 
 
Over the past three years, Greece has substantially reformed its pension system. However current pension 
expenditures are still relatively high, the expected increase in the future has been reduced drastically to 15% of 
GDP by 2050.  Reforms  implemented in recent years were done under the loan package agreed between Greece, 
the EU, the IMF and the ECB1.   
 
3.2 The pension system in Italy 
The Italian public pension system is one of the most generous PAYG systems, which has resulted in a kind of 
quasi-complementary system (private, typically Bismarkian2). However, in the 1990s, this public pension system 
began to show signs of weakness, especially because of its huge public expenditures. The cause of crisis of the 
Italian pension system  is considered an increase of life expectancy, decreasing birth-rates, the change in labor 
markets and the uncontrolled increase of public spending for social security.  Nevertheless Italy  is a never-
ending pension reforming country still has negative fiscal prospects for Italian public pensions, especially due to 
the very slow phasing in of the new system. This should be accelerated. The differential retirement age between 
men and women should be equalized. The design flaws of the NDC formula should be fixed. One of the good 
practice likely to be considered is the introduction of the NDC system, which  will reduce average replacement 
rates. While this will have a minor impact to employees in a Standard Employment relationship, the effects for 
workers holding atypical contracts will be detrimental. Pension credits and more homogeneity in treating various 
working categories should be a priority.  
An increase in retirement age has been considered as a major driver of pension spending reductions in 
Italy. With public pension spending representing 15.4% of GDP (compared to an OECD average of 7.8%), Italy 
had the most expensive pension system within the OECD in 2009. As a consequence, the government addressed 
a series of reforms. One of the most important reforms was the introduction of pension funds into Italian 
legislation. 
Currently the pension system in Italy contains four basic elements: A) the general pension plan for the 
hired workers, B) the pension plan for the self-employed, C) the pension plan for civil servants and D) pension 
plans for selected occupational groups. (Schludi M. 2005). There also functions the so-called social cheque 
(assegno sociale) for all those who turned 65 and whose pension plans do not provide sufficient means to live 
on3. 
Pension reform has decreased generosity substantially and could result in a significant rise in poverty; 
unemployment carries a very heavy price in pension terms. Pension system quite expensive at present, but 
reform reduces future rises in contribution rates by decreasing pension wealth very significantly for future 
pensioners.  The combination of generous benefits, powerful trade unions, and unstable governing coalitions has 
made reform hazardous  for Italian political leaders. Nevertheless succeeding Italian governments have managed 
                                                 
1  Greece’s economic policy program –monitored through 12 quarterly reviews- is supported with a €110 billion 
financing package provided by the euro area member states (€ 80 billion) and the IMF (€ 30 billion). 
2 A Bismarckian pension system is associated with larger public pension expenditures  with a smaller fraction of private 
pension and with lower income inequality than Beveridgean systems.  
3 In 2 004 it amounted to €367 monthly. The Handbook of Western European Pension Politics (2007), p. 881. 
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to pass a series of significant reforms that have substantially scaled back benefits. The long transition periods 
that largely insulate current and near-retirees from the changes, however, call into question their political 
durability. Prior to the reforms of the 1990s, the normal or full-benefit retirement age for Italian workers was 
officially 60 for men and 55 for women.  
The reforms implemented during the 1990s tried to tackle a series of problems inherent in the previous 
system. The most important changes were designed in 1992 (Giuliano Amato reform plan), according to Act 
421/199210 and Act 124/199311, which introduced an increase in the retirement age for men (from 60 to 65 ) 
and women (from 55 to 60 ) and this changes to be phased in over ten years.  At the same time, the reform 
increased the number of wage years counted in the initial pension benefit formula from 5 to 10 for older workers 
with at least 15 years of contributions at the time of reform and to a career average for younger workers with less 
than 15 years of contributions.  
As a result of the reform, pension expenditure constituted 14.9% of the GDP (Franco D. 2002). 
Moreover, the minimum number of years of contributions necessary for early retirement was increased from 15 
to 20 years. This reform was followed by the failure of  the ambitious reform of Prime Minister Silvio 
Berluskoni  in 1994, which concerned (Marano A., Sestito P. 2005): 1) the incitement for later retirement for the 
participants of the old pension plans, 2) the introduction of the required period of employment of 35 years to be 
eligible for pension under the new plan for those who wanted to retire earlier than at the age of 65 in the case of 
men and at the age of 60 in the case of women, 3) the increase of the minimum early retirement age under the 
new plan to 60 in 2008 and to 62 in the years to come (Arza and Kolhi, 2011). The Berlusconi proposal, however, 
was defeated in the wake of fierce protests by the Italian trade unions—and the resulting political firestorm 
contributed to the rapid dissolution of his first government.1 
The next 1995 reform (supported by a left-wing parliamentary majority (Berlusconi’s successor as 
prime minister) – the “Dini government”2) included a huge reduction in expenditure on pensions because it 
introduced a mixed system, which is in part PAYG and in part a funded system, emphasizing complementary 
social insurance systems. This reform possessed the features of a systemic reform, unlike to parametric “Amato 
reform”. Even so, this system is not fully developed, as the complementary social insurance measures 
experienced delays. According to this reform, the benefit structure was modified to control costs, and a flexible 
retirement rate was also introduced (from a minimum of 57 years of age to a maximum of 65). Additionally, new 
computation rules were established for seniority pensions.  Dini managed to pass a second major reform which, 
after a long transition, will replace Italy’s traditional defined benefit pension system with a new system of 
“notional defined contribution” (NDC) accounts. The system’s financing remains entirely pay-as-you-go—hence 
the term “notional.”  
Thus, according to Dini reform essential constituents were the following (Schludi M. 2005): 1) pension 
contributions were a part of social insurance premiums, 2) introduction of the individual pension contribution 
record known as notionally defined contribution (NDC), 3) pension rate was dependent on the amount of 
contributions, which were to be indexed by a current index of the average increase of the GDP of the last five 
years, 4) gradual increase of the sufficient period of employment from 35 to 40 years, which allowed pension 
eligibility, 5) introduction of the random retirement age within the 57 to 65 age bracket (Gronchi S. Nistico S. 
2006)  to calculate the rate of pension the amount of consolidated pension contributions was divided by life 
expectancy after the retirement, 6) a decrease of the minimum required sufficient period of employment to 5 
years, which allowed for eligibility for the base pension with the simultaneous cancellation of the base level 
pension, 7) the  replacement of the social pension (pensione sociale) by the social cheque (assegno sociale) 
(Ferrera M., Jessoula M. 2007). 
Italian legislation recognizes two broad categories of complementary pensions: occupational plans and 
personal plans. There are three types of occupational plans: negotiable, open and pre-existing; but there is only 
one type of personal plan: the individual pension plan. 
The difficulties for old-age pension reform in Italy are illustrative of both “particularism” and 
“populism.” However, unlike the case in Spain (the “Toledo Pact”3/Pacto de Toledo), the absence of a “rainbow” 
consensus among the political forces has so far frustrated comprehensive pension rationalization, something that 
in turn has further fuelled neo-populism. This Pact emphasised strengthen social protection for the most 
vulnerable groups who have a lower level of pension cover.   
                                                 
1  David Natali, “Italy: The Reformed Pension System,” 2004, p. 2. Available at 
http://www.ose.be/files/mocpension/ItalyOMC.pdf. 
2 A form of government where decision-makers are chosen for a governing office based on their technical expertise and 
background. 
3 The “Toledo pact” is  is an ambitious reform of the Spanish social security system approved by the Spanish parliament on 6 
April 1995, aimed at streamlining and guaranteeing the future of the Spanish social security system, based on the 
recommendation of World Bank in 1987.  Boletín Oficial de las Cortes Generales, Congreso de los Diputados, 12 de abril de 
1995. Número 134   
International Affairs and Global Strategy                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-574X (Paper)  ISSN 2224-8951 (Online) 
Vol.25, 2014 
 
13 
The two most popular reforms in Italy were the Amato reform and, in 1995, the Dini reform. According 
to these reforms, the public old age pension system changed from a defined benefit to a notional defined 
contribution system (NDC), which was applied to all workers on a pro-rata basis since January 2012 (rather than 
from the mid-2020s). The increase in retirement age (again, since January 2012) and the gender harmonisation of 
the public and private sector pension systems were also publicly assumed as objectives.  
Prime Minister Romano Prodi’s government enacted a more modest reforms in 1997, based on  the 
Maastricht’s treaty’s fiscal targets. Later on  in 2004, more essential reform was  impelmented, by Berlusconi’s 
government.  Thus, during  the last decades and still in currently  pension reform in Italy has provoked repeated 
clashes between reform minded governments and strong trade unions.1 The role of Unions still remains essential 
high in Italy.  Especially after the 2011 reform there is a broad discussion among social partners regarding the 
effectiveness of adopted reforms in pursuing financial sustainability.  
In 2011, retirement ages in Italy  is 65 and 60 for men and women, respectively. According to  2012 
reform retirement age  raised  to 66 for men (and for women in the public sector), which will also be the normal 
retirement age for all women by 2018. Private-sector workers, however, contribute 7.41 percent of wages to a 
severance pay fund, called the “Trattamento di Fine Rapporto,” or TFR.  Only new workforce entrants in their 
early twenties were fully affected. 2  Pension expert at the OECD  (d’Addio,2013) considers there is  a high  risk 
of retired people’s poverty however financial sustainability of Italy and . Government deficit  still is remarkably  
high in the region with more than 1 million and half Euro, (Figure 5). The second position is presented by Spain 
with about 1 million Euro. The rest of  countries  Greece and Portugal  keeps almost the same amount of this 
indicator. 
Figure 5. Government deficit,debt (in Mln. Euro) 
 
Source: Eurostat,2014 
 
3.4    The pension system in Spain 
The Spanish welfare state incorporates elements of both Bismarckian and Beveridgean traditions, and can be 
labelled with respect to other regimes of social protection. It combines universal and targeted access to services 
and benefits. Since the end of the Franco regime in 1975, Spanish political leaders have placed great emphasis 
on achieving consensus among the major political parties, employer associations, and trade unions. Both Spain 
and Italy introduced mandatory state retirement insurance for private-sector workers in 1919. The beginning of 
Franco regime, in the late 1930s, most Spanish workers enjoyed at least some sort of minimal pension coverage. 
But successive years, the generosity of pension benefits for employment sectors was increased. Perhaps the most 
significant liberalization occurred in 1963, when legislation created a large number of special schemes running 
parallel to the main old-age insurance program, the “Régimen General de la Seguridad Social,” or RGSS (J.C. 
Capretta, 2007). 
 Since 1975 the harmonization of contribution and pension benefit regulations among various schemes  
started during the rapid transition  to constitutional democracy period, after Franco.  The public pension plan had 
been reformed  under  new jurisdiction of one agency and introduced  “Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad 
Social,” or INSS.  But “Régimenes Especiales de la Seguridad Social,” or RESS still  continues  to operate for 
the selfemployed, agricultural workers, seaman, domestic employees, and coal miners.   Which is   a traditional, 
                                                 
1 James C. Capretta, 2007.   Global Aging and the Sustainability of Public Pension Systems,  An Assessment of Reform 
Efforts in Twelve Developed Countries, Center for Strategic & International Studies, Washington, DC 20006 
2 Pensions at a Glance, 2013  
International Affairs and Global Strategy                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-574X (Paper)  ISSN 2224-8951 (Online) 
Vol.25, 2014 
 
14 
defined benefit, pay-asyou-go system.  Workers with the minimum 15 years of contributions who retire at age 65 
receive a benefit equal to 50 percent of their average covered annual earnings. The replacement rate rises with 
each additional year of contributions until it reaches 100 percent for workers with at least 35 years of 
contributions. Early retirement with reduced benefits is allowed beginning at age 61 for workers with 30 years of 
contributions. Spain also maintains a variety of minimum income provisions for the elderly. Retirees who have 
contributed to the RGSS for at least 15 years but have earned a pension below about 30 percent of the average 
wage are eligible for a “top up” payment. Participants in the special schemes enjoy a similar but more generous 
minimum pension guarantee. For persons who are not eligible for a pension at all, there is a minimum income 
payment equal to about 20 percent of the average wage.  
The main demographic trends of Spanish population is substantial increases of the groups over 60, 65, 
80 age. In the last decades the number of younger people has increased by 90% while the number of old aged 
people increased by 195 %1 . Therefore the ageing population in future decades will make older people’s 
dependency a more urgent problem.   Pension spending projection  from  2010 to 2060 these countries  are 
anticipated to  keep  their indicators  within 15 %, but  most representative parameter is  characterised to Italy 
and Greece followed by Portugal and Spain while this rate for EU (27 countries) ranges from less than 
10%.(Figure 6) 
Figure 6.  Pension expenditure projections (baseline scenario) 
 
Source: Eurostat,2014 
 
The present pension system in Spain fulfils its function of supplying older people with sufficient resources. The 
surplus in the pension system even allows for allocating resources in the form of securities to the pension reserve 
fund. According to various forecasts, the resources in the  pension reserve fund should be sufficient until 2020 or 
20362. It seems that the only way to prevent system insolvency is to reach for capital solutions. So far, however, 
in Spain there have been no attempts aiming at the introduction of system changes concerned with the adopted 
pension solutions. The prepared and theoretically reviewed proposal on the transition to the NDC system 
presented (Vidal-Melia C. Dominguez-Fabian, 2006) in 2006 did not go beyond the phase of scientific projection.  
Pensions have become a critical lifeline in Spain. With the unemployment rate at 25%, and even higher among 
young people, many Spaniards have become reliant on pension-drawing parents and grandparents to support 
them.    
Economists estimate that as many as 1.7 million of the 16 million Spanish households have no salary 
earners. Currently, Spain spends around 10% of its GDP on public pensions, the least expressed value in SE, but 
slightly higher than the OECD average. However, high life expectancy and low fertility are resulting in rapid 
population aging. This will increase the pressure on pension financing in the future. In 2060, there will also be 
fewer than two people of active age per retiree compared to more than three currently. 
The 2011 pension reform tightened the link between earnings and pension benefits, increased the 
retirement age to 67 and introducing the general principle of automatic adjustment to life expectancy. Recently, 
however, Spain has achieved a substantial reduction of old-age poverty, from 21% to 12% between 2007 and 
2010. On average, in the OECD countries, the poverty rate among the elderly fell from 15.1% to 12.8% over the 
                                                 
1 Ministerio Trabajo Y Asuntos Sociales, 2005. Report on the Spanish Strategy for the Future of the Pension System  
2 Synthesis report on adequate and sustainable pensions. Annex. Country summaries (2006), p. 42 . 
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same period.1 
Arguably, Spain’s pension benefits are more important than unemployment insurance, a benefit for 
which eligibility eventually expires. The sustainability of the pension system has been one of the main concerns 
of institutions across Europe, as well as the Spanish government, since the financial crisis began. A reform of the 
Spanish pension system was not, however, put into law until March 2011, after its main elements were agreed by 
the social partners and the socialist government at the time. The government assumed it was necessary to get the 
backing of the social partners in order to keep this sensitive issue within a broad social and political consensus, 
as has been the case since the mid-1990s. 
Between 1998 and 2010, the Spanish social security system ran surpluses, so that in 2011 there were 66 
billion euros (around 6.3 per cent of GDP) accumulated in the reserve fund, increasingly invested in Spanish 
government bonds (Klaus Busch, 2013). 
According to Law 27/2011, as the main aspects of the agreement on pensions, has been increased the 
retirement age from 65 to 67 years and the legal age of early retirement in future will be risen  from 61 to 63 
years.2 There is no discrimination for reasons of sex in the Spanish pension system in terms of eligibility 
requirements and ways of calculating the pensions awarded, though  there is a kind of  differences in the amount 
of pension benefits for both sexes.  Which is explained  relatively shorter career of  women´employment history 
than men`s one.  
The reform of the public pension system approved on August 1, 2011, after the adoption of the Report 
on the Evaluation and Reform of the Toledo Pact, includes as its main subsequent measures: 
 the gradual increase of the statutory retirement age by two years, to 67;  
 recognition of long-term contribution histories, in such a way that retirement at 65 is possible with a 
100% pension when a contribution period of 38 and a half years is certified;  
 increase in incentives for voluntary extension of working life beyond the statutory retirement age; and 
 use for calculation of the new pension of the contribution bases of the last 25 years prior to retirement, 
as opposed to the 15 years established before the reform.  
The radical changes in the security system   implemented due to the Royal Decree 1131/2002 
introducing new regulations with part-time workers and created the part-time retirement scheme.  
In 2011, the 27/2011 Act was adopted in order to improve and modernise of the social security system. 
Which has increased  the retirement age to 67, and changed the reference period for calculating pension benefit, 
it has also increased the number of years of contribution required to receive the maximum allowance and 
important part of this act was  tightened eligibility requirements for early retirement. The most recent  Act  the 
government also has approved was  23/2013 act on regulating the sustainability factor and the revaluation index 
for the pension benefits of the social security system. Belt-tightening policy through austerity measures has 
introduced  in Spain. Spain is struggling to cut a budget deficit. Therefore the main decision  of this 
problem  lies  on the actions towards boosting and forcing  a complimentary pension plan -  the second pillar.  A 
future with increasingly low public pensions brings up the need for families to plan for alternative savings that 
enable them to maintain their living standards after retirement.  
 
4. Discussion and Conclusions 
Based on the literature review and statistical data, we can argue that the perception of economic crisis alone is 
not enough to explain the content of the pension reforms. It is well recognized that the pension system is  
considerably difficult branch of  the welfare  policy for making reforms; it builds up expectations and establishes 
legal elements that are hard to reverse. Study  shows that such a strong old age  solidarity pension system among 
three pillars, especially   the first  pillar, functioning under the pay-as-you-go formula still maintains very strong 
and  powerful  relationship between old-age pensions and the politicians’ will in SE. 
The pension crisis, neatly illustrates that challenges may be turned into opportunities if governments 
take early and well-designed action. Aging is not something that has to be prevented, but it should be managed. 
Aging becomes a threat when faced with ineffective pension systems created by past governments. In addition, 
pension reform in political terms is always corrosive of political popularity. It is always easier to pass the 
problem to a future generation. Moreover, pension reform in a PAYG world necessarily involves the reneging of 
a promise; reformers must admit that the (unconditional) promise given in the past had actually a limited 
application.  
                                                 
1 OECD., (2011), Pensions at a Glance 2011 Retirement-income Systems in OECD and G20 Countries, Online Country 
Profiles, including personal income tax and social security contributions.   
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/pension_glance-2011-en (Accessed on 16 January, 2014) 
2  Pablo Sanz de Miguel, 2013, Pension reform rows back on early retirement benefits, European Industrial Relations 
Observatory (EIRO) 
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Thus, the comparative analysis of how the recent crisis has affected Southern European countries and 
their pension systems seems to indicate that significant reforms have been necessary when the negative effects of 
the economic crisis were coupled with a poor performance of the public pension system. In addition, adopting a 
multi-dimensional approach to assess the reforms in the four countries will show that improvements in financial 
sustainability may have been achieved at the expense of benefit adequacy. This indicates that substantial 
challenges still lie ahead, and more policy debate is expecting  in this area in the upcoming years. 
The  three main crucial problems for southern European countries which have been considered  are the 
following factors –demographic,  economic growth, and normative or institutional factor.  For solution these 
challenges there are some conventional approaches and opportunities, but because   reforming pension system is  
regarding to  politically sensitive issue, each country will need to find its own solution based on social economic 
indicators. It is important to note that all severe austerity measures and structural reforms aim to improve the 
fiscal situation in the country, but  social security policy are easy sacrifice of austerity measures.  
There are opportunities and several measures that should be taken in order to control spending trends 
over coming decades in Southern European pension challenges –  
-       Gradually raising retirement age, which  would be an attractive option for economies, because it  can 
help boost GDP by increasing the number of years the average person spends working rather than in 
retirement, and  have some clear advantages by promoting higher employment levels and economic growth. 
(it is easier for the public to understand than cutting pensions or increasing contributions, because those 
who cannot work longer need to be protected.)  
-       Abolishing special categories in the pension system 
- Indexing only the minimum pension 
- Raising Contribution Rates, But in countries where the tax burden is already high, further contribution 
hikes may jeopardize competitiveness and growth prospects 
- Equalise the pensionable age between men and women; and, 
- Raising Employment Rates and increasing revenues 
- Indexation to inflation rather than earnings 
- Restrict access to early retirement schemes and other early exit pathways 
- Introducing employee contributions 
- Reducing first pillar benefits and reducing Pension Benefits 
- Introducing mandatory  funded DC second pillar 
- Encouraging voluntary third pillar  
- Reducing replacement rates could lead to inadequate pension incomes.  
This kind of reforms in pension system would need to be accompanied by adequate social assistance 
programs to protect those who cannot extend their work lives. Indeed, the primary purpose of pensions is to 
ensure an adequate standard of post-retirement living for individuals, consistent with the resources available to 
society. The challenge is to reform pension systems without hurting their ability to provide income security for 
the elderly and prevent old-age poverty. 
Despite the difference between GIPS countries, with respect to the speed and the impact of 
demographic aging and with respect to the policy reforms implemented and their likely long-term effects, 
population aging is a common trend and thus these countries face similar problems, although obviously the 
extent and details of these problems differ between countries. Each country should take own activities that fit 
best in this country’s tradition and specific circumstances which can be  identified for  appropriate policy 
decisions.  Nonetheless, the similarity of the problems faced by different countries would imply that they can 
learn from each other.  
Due to presenting the diagnostic of the problems related to  pension system  it is  clear that the public 
pension system in all  four countries is facing major problems, due to the aging of population in all these four 
countries. It is not easy to determine the optimal balance between a solidarity -PAYG arrangement and a fully 
funded system, because both are depending on the characteristics of the shocks that buffet an economy. So the 
hot debate on pension issues is never over, and the challenge goes on in the years to come.  
 
Bibliography  
Aben, M. (2011),  Overview of the Italian pension system. 
Addio A., (2013), “Challenges For Pension Reforms in OECD Countries: Results From Pensions At a Glance 
2013”. Report to the European Commission.  http://www.oecd.org/els/pensions/pensionsataglance.htm 
(Accessed on 25  January, 2014) 
Affairs, S., Torres, M. B., People, E., & Services, S. (2006). Rescaling Social Welfare Policies in Spain, 
(February). 
Ageing indicators in Portugal, PORDATA  (2014),  http://www.pordata.pt/en/Portugal/Ageing+indicators-526 
International Affairs and Global Strategy                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-574X (Paper)  ISSN 2224-8951 (Online) 
Vol.25, 2014 
 
17 
Angelaki, M., & Carolo, D. (n.d.-a). South-European Pension Systems : Challenges and Reform Prospect, 488–
516. 
Angelaki, M., & Carolo, D. (n.d.-b). South-European Pension Systems : Challenges and Reform Prospect, 488–
516. 
Arriba, A., & Moreno, L. (2002),  Spain : Poverty , Social Exclusion and “ Safety Nets ” ∗, (September), 1–73. 
Arza, C., and Kolhi, M., (2011), Pension reform in Europe, politics policies and outcomes. Reutledge/EUI 
Studoes in the Political Economy of Welfare. 
 Association of British Insurers, European Pension Reform and Private Pensions: An Analysis of the EU’s Six 
Largest Countries (London: Association of British Insurers, May , 2004). 
Barr, N.,  (2000),   Reforming Pensions: Myths, Truths, and Policy Choices. IMF Working Paper, no. WP/00/139. 
Boldrin, Michele, and Sergi Jiménez-Martín, (2003),  “Evaluating Spanish Pension Expenditure Under 
Alternative Reform Scenarios,” preliminary draft (September 15, 2003). In Social Security Programs and 
Retirement around the World: Fiscal Implications (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, forthcoming). 
Available at http://www.nber.org/books/intlSS-p3/spain6-29-05.pdf.  
Boldrin, Michele, Sergi Jiménez-Martín, and Franco Peracchi, (1997),  “Social Security and Retirement in 
Spain,” NBER Working Paper no. 6136 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, August 
1997). 
Brugiavini, Agar, and Vincenzo Galasso,(2003),  “The Social Security Reform Process in Italy: Where Do We 
Stand?” Working Paper no. 2003-052 (Ann Arbor, MI: Michigan Retirement Research Center, July 2003). 
Brugiavini, Agar, Franco Peracchi, and David Wise, (2003),   “Pensions and Retirement Incentives. A Tale of 
Three Countries: Italy, Spain, and the USA,” CEIS Tor Vergata Research Paper Series, vol. 2, no. 6 (Rome: 
Center for International Studies on Economic Growth at the University of Rome, February 2003). 
Busch, Hermann, C., Hingrichs, K., Scholten, T., (2013),  Euro Crisis, Austerity Policy and the European Social 
Model ,How Crisis Policies in Southern Europe Threaten the EUs Social Dimension. International Policy 
Analysis. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung  
Capretta, James C. 2007.   Global Aging and the Sustainability of Public Pension Systems,  An Assessment of 
Reform Efforts in Twelve Developed Countries, Center for Strategic & International Studies, Washington, DC 
20006 
Carrera, L., Angelaki, M., Carolo, D., & Paper, C. (2009),  Structures , political competition and     societal veto 
players : the politics of pension reform in Southern Europe. 
Ceccarelli, Simone, Enrico Mattioni, and Ambrogio I. Rinaldi, (2005), “Pension Reform and the Long-Run 
Growth of Pension Funds in Italy: A Simulation Model,” (preliminary draft, March 10,), pp. 18-19. Available at 
http://www.dauphine.fr/eurisco/Cecarelli-workshop2005.pdf. 
Chulia E. Asensio M (2007), Spain: Between Majority Rule and Incrementalism in: The Handbook of Western 
European Pension Politics (2007), edited by Ellen M. Immergut, Karen M. Anderson & Isabelle Schulze, 
Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 499-554; 
Chuliá, Elisa, (2001),  “Pension Reforms in Europe: Common Challenges, Shared Objectives and Different 
Institutional Arrangements,” paper presented at the International Sociological Association Annual Conference 
(RC 19) on “Old and New Inequalities: What Challenges for Welfare States?” Oviedo, Spain, September 6-9, 
2001.  
Commission, E., & Affairs, S. (2011),  Annual National Report 2011 Pensions , Health Care and    Long-term 
Care, (May); 
Constitution of  Portugal, Spain, Greece and  Italy.  
Corin Taylor, Senior Policy Adviser,( 2009),  The Pensions Apartheid: The problem, the cost and the tough 
choices that need to be made written by Corin Taylor, Senior Policy Adviser 2009 
Cunha Vanda, Ariana Paulo, Nuno Sousa Pereira and Hélder Reis, 2014,  THE  REFORM OF THE 
PORTUGUESE PUBLIC EMPLOYEES’ PENSION SYSTEM: REASONS AND RESULTS  
Cunha, V. (2009). Working Papers Series, (June). 
Directorate General for Internal Policies Economic Governance Support Unit (EGOV) 
2014. The Troika and financial assistance in the euro area: successes and failures, Economic and Monetary 
Affairs Committee of European Parliament. 
Eatwell J. (2003), "The Anatomy of the Pension "crisis"and Three Fallacies on Pensions". Cambridge CB2 1AG, 
UK  
EPC (Economic Policy Committee). (2001), Budgetary challenges posed by aging populations: the impact on 
public spending on pensions, health and long term care for elderly and possible indicators of the long term 
sustainability of public finances. Brussels, 24 October, 2001. 
EPC (Economic Policy Committee). (2009), 2009 Ageing Report: Economic and budgetary projections for the 
EU-27  Member States (2008-2060) 2009. 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication14992_en.pdf  
International Affairs and Global Strategy                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-574X (Paper)  ISSN 2224-8951 (Online) 
Vol.25, 2014 
 
18 
Esping-Andersen, G. (1990),  “The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism”. Cambridge: Polity Press  
Esping-Andersen, G. (1999), “Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies”. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.  
Eurostat,  (2013) ADEQUACY AND SUSTAINABILITY OF PENSIONS; 
Eurostat,  ADEQUACY AND SUSTAINABILITY OF PENSIONS, 2013; 
Eurostat, OECD, IMF,  and World Economic Outlook. 2014; 
Ferreira, L. V. (2005),  Social Protection and Chronic Poverty : Portugal and the Southern European   Welfare 
Regime Leonor Vasconcelos Ferreira, (March). 
Ferrera M., Jessoula M. (2007), Italy: A Narrow Gate for Path-Shift in: The Handbook of Western European 
Pension Politics (2007), edited by Ellen M. Immergut, Karen M. Anderson & Isabelle Schulze, Oxford 
University Press, New York, pp. 396-453 
Ferrera, M.  (1996),  “The Southern Model’ of Welfare in Social Europe”, Journal of European Social Policy, 
vol 6, 1. 17-37 
Forni, Lorenzo, and Raffaela Giordano,  (2001), “Funding a PAYG Pension System: The Case of Italy,” Fiscal 
Studies, vol. 22, no. 4, December 2001, pp. 487-526. 
Franco D. (2002), Italy: A Never-Ending Pension Reform in: Social Security Pension Reform in Europe (2002), 
edited by Martin Feldstein and Horst Siebert, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, pp. 211-
261 
Franco D., Sartor N. (2006), NDCs in Italy: Unsatisfactory Present, Uncertain Future in: Pension Reform: 
Issues and Prospect for Non-financial Defined Contribution (NDC) Schemes (2006), edited by Robert Holzmann 
and Edward Palmer, The World Bank, Washington, D.C., pp. 467-492. 
Franco, Daniele, (2001), “Italy: The Role of Funding,” paper presented at the International Seminar on Pensions, 
Jerusalem, Israel, June 14, 2001. 
Giovannuzzi, Salvatore, and Cinzia Ferrara, (2001),  “Restructuring the First Pillar: The Reform of the Italian 
Pension System: The Contributory System,” paper presented at the Seminar for Actuaries and Statisticians, 
Montevideo, Uruguay, November 21-22, 2001.  
Gronchi S., Nistico S. (2006), Implementing the NDC Theoretical Model: A Comparison of Italy and Sweden in: 
Pension Reform: Issues and Prospect for Non-financial Defined Contribution (NDC) Schemes (2006), edited by 
Robert Holzmann and Edward Palmer, The World Bank, Washington, D.C., pp. 493-515; 
Grosen, A. (2013), The Italian pension system : reforms and the change in the future composition of pension 
income, (January).  
Gupta, A. (2010),  Greek Pwension Reforms : The Structure to Build A unstable Bridge to; The Greek National 
Strategy Report on Pension (2005), p. 8. 
 ILO regulations;  
IMK Report. 2013. Die Krise schwelt weiter, Die Krise schwelt weiter, Gemeinsame Diagnose des Makro-
Konsortiums (The crisis continues to smolder, Joint diagnosis of macro-consortium) Macroeconomic Policy 
Institute  http://www.boeckler.de/pdf/p_imk_report_80_2013.pdf  
International Marxist Tendency. Portugal: Massive demonstration against cuts and austerity 
http://www.marxist.com/portugal-massive-demononstration-against-cuts.htm 
International Monetary Fund, 2011. Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (Portuguese version), and 
Technical Memorandum of Understanding 
Joint report by the Commission and the Council on adequate and sustainable pensions, Council of the European 
Union, Brussels, 10 March 2003, ECOFIN 76, SOC 115, 7165/03. 
Jorge Martin, (2012), Portugal: Massive demonstration against cuts and austerity 
http://www.marxist.com/portugal-massive-demononstration-against-cuts.htm 
Katrougalos, G., Lazaridis, G., (2003),  “ Southern European Welfare States”, Palgrave/Macmillan.  
Katrougalos,G.,  Lazaridis, G., (2008)  Articles Τhe South European welfare states at the dawn of the new 
Millennium : Ιdentity and problems, 3(1), 5–25.  
Kimball, Lisa Ph.D. 2011, SPIRITUAL VITALITY OVER 70, Center for the Ministry of Teaching, Virginia 
Theological Seminary 
Leandro, N., Carrera., Marina, Angelaki, Daniel Carolo, (2010),  South-European Pension Systems: Challenges 
and Reform Prospect   
     Leibfried, S. (1992), “Towards a European welfare state? On integrating Poverty Regimes into the European 
Community”, in Z. Ferge and J. E. Kolberg (Eds) Social Policy in a Changing Europe, Frankfurt, Campus Verlag.  
Malmberg, B. K. Tamas, D. Bloom, R. Munz, D. Canning, 2006 Global Population Ageing, Migration and 
European External Policies, © Institutet för Framtidsstudier 
Marano A., Sestito P. (2005),  Retirement age rules and pension reforms in Italy in: Pension Systems: Beyond 
Mandatory Retirement (2005), edited by Elsa Fornero and Paolo Sestito, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK – 
Northampton, MA, USA, pp. 144-184;  
International Affairs and Global Strategy                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-574X (Paper)  ISSN 2224-8951 (Online) 
Vol.25, 2014 
 
19 
Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy  Conditionality, (2011) - Portugal:  3 May; 
Ministerio Trabajo Y Asuntos Sociales, 2005. Report on the Spanish Strategy for the Future of the Pension 
System  
Muenz, R. (2007), Aging and Demographic Change in European Societies : Main Trends and Alternative Policy 
Options, (0703).  
Natali, David, (2004), “Italy: The Reformed Pension System,”. Available at 
http://www.ose.be/files/mocpension/ItalyOMC.pdf.  
Nations, U. (2013),  World Economic Situation and Prospects 2013,  (January); 
Nunes José Pavão (2007), Pension Funds in Portugal,  World Forum OECD, (June); 
OECD (2013), OECD and G20 Indicators (GIPS) 
OECD., (2011),  Is the European Welfare State Really More Expensive? Indicators on Social Spending (1980-
2012) and a Manual to the OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX). Migration Working Papers No. 124 
OECD., (2011), Pensions at a Glance 2011 Retirement-income Systems in OECD and G20 Countries, Online 
Country Profiles, including personal income tax and social security contributions.  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/pension_glance-2011-en (Accessed on 16 January, 2014) 
OECD., (2014), Pensions at a Glance, 2013, Retirement-income Systems in OECD and G20 Countries, Online 
Country Profiles, including personal income tax and social security contributions.   
Ortiz and Cummins, (2013), “Age of Austerity: A Review of Public Expenditures and Adjustment Measures in 
181 Countries”, Initiative for Policy Dialogue and the South Centre Working Paper, May 2013; Report of the 
UN Independent Expert on extreme poverty and human rights, Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona, 17 March 2011, 
A/HRC/17/34 
Pablo Sanz de Miguel, 2013, Pension reform rows back on early retirement benefits, European Industrial 
Relations Observatory (EIRO) 
Pension Markets in Focus, 2013, OECD; 
Pension Politics in Austria, France, Germany, Italy and Sweden, Amsterdam University Press – Changing 
Welfare States Series, Amsterdam 
Rodrigues, P. G. (2006),  Pension Reform in Portugal : A Dynamic General Equilibrium Analysis, (December). 
Schludi M. (2005), The Reform of Bismarckian Pension Systems: A Comparison of 
Schneider, O., (2009),  Reforming Pensions in Europe: Economic Fundamentals and Political Factors. 
Economics at Charles University in Prague and at Georgetown University, Washington DC; Czech Journal of 
Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 4 
Social Charter of the Council of Europe (1961), the Community Charter of the fundamental social rights of 
workers (1989), the European charter of fundamental rights (2000); 
Spanish Ministry of Labor and Social Security, (2002), “Annex to the Report on the Spanish National Strategy 
for the Future of the Pension System,” paper submitted to the European Commission’s Social Protection 
Committee, September 12, 2002. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/social_protection/docs/es_pensionannex_en.pdf 
Stańko D. (2004), System emerytalny w Portugalii in: Systemy emerytalne w krajach Unii Europejskiej (2004), 
edited by Tadeusz Szumlicz and Maciej Żukowski, TWIGGER, Warszawa, pp. 269-284 
Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) study (Munich Center for the Economics of 
Aging, (2011). 
Synthesis report on adequate and sustainable pensions. Annex. Country summaries (2006), p. 42 . 
Tânia Cristina Simões de Matos dos Santos,  2012, Immigration and pension system in Portugal, Center of 
Research in International Business & Strategy, WORKING PAPER Nº 84/2012  
Tinios, P. (2003), Pensions in Greece : The Economics of the politics of “ Reform by Instalments ”, (December), 
1–18. 
Vidal-Melia C., Dominguez-Fabian I. (2006), The Spanish Pension System: Issues of Introducing NDCs in: 
Pension Reform: Issues and Prospect for Non-financial Defined Contribution (NDC) Schemes (2006), edited by 
Robert Holzmann and Edward Palmer, The World Bank, Washington, D.C., pp. 611-637 .  
Whitehouse, E (2007), Pensions Panorama: Retirement-income Systems in 53 Countries, The World Bank, 
Washington D.C. 
World Population Ageing (2013), Department of Economic and Social Affairs  Population Division,  United 
nations,  New York, 2013 
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/ageing/WorldPopulationAgeing2013.pdf  
 
 
 
 
The IISTE is a pioneer in the Open-Access hosting service and academic event 
management.  The aim of the firm is Accelerating Global Knowledge Sharing. 
 
More information about the firm can be found on the homepage:  
http://www.iiste.org 
 
CALL FOR JOURNAL PAPERS 
There are more than 30 peer-reviewed academic journals hosted under the hosting 
platform.   
Prospective authors of journals can find the submission instruction on the 
following page: http://www.iiste.org/journals/  All the journals articles are available 
online to the readers all over the world without financial, legal, or technical barriers 
other than those inseparable from gaining access to the internet itself.  Paper version 
of the journals is also available upon request of readers and authors.  
 
MORE RESOURCES 
Book publication information: http://www.iiste.org/book/ 
 
IISTE Knowledge Sharing Partners 
EBSCO, Index Copernicus, Ulrich's Periodicals Directory, JournalTOCS, PKP Open 
Archives Harvester, Bielefeld Academic Search Engine, Elektronische 
Zeitschriftenbibliothek EZB, Open J-Gate, OCLC WorldCat, Universe Digtial 
Library , NewJour, Google Scholar 
 
 
